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Multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core
Abstract: We introduce the class of multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games, which
generalizes the well-kown two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an
arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided Bo¨hm-
Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors
instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable
in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern.
Keywords: Assignment games, multi-sided markets, homogeneous goods, core, extreme
points
JEL Classification: C70, C78
Resum: En aquest treball introdu¨ım la classe de multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment
games, que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignacio´ de Bo¨hm-Bawerk bilaterals a
situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol
multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de
sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core
d’aquests jocs d’assignacio´ e´s estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.
1 Introduction
Consider a market with two different goods, for instance software and hardware products.
In this market there are nS owners of one unit of software and nH owners of one unit of
hardware. All of them want to sell their goods. There are also nB buyers, which want to
buy at most one unit of software and one unit of hardware and have no utility on buying
separately either one. The ith software seller values her good at cSi dollars, the j
th hardware
seller values her good at cHj dollars and the k
th buyer values the bundle formed by the software
and the hardware goods of the former sellers at wkij dollars.
In this market, a transaction can only be carried out when a buyer pays for exactly one
unit of software and one unit of hardware. Let pi and qj be the prices that the k
th buyer
pays for the goods of the ith software seller and the jth hardware seller, respectively. At
these prices, her utility is given by wkij − pi − qj, whereas the benefit of the software seller
is pi − c
S
i and the benefit of the hardware seller is qj − c
H
j . If we assume that the utility
of the agents is monetary and transferable the total surplus generated by this transaction is(
wkij − pi − qj
)
+
(
pi − c
S
i
)
+
(
qj − c
H
j
)
= wkij − c
S
i − c
H
j . If w
k
ij − c
S
i − c
H
j < 0 we assume
that no transaction will be carried out since no prices favorable to all parts exist. Let
aijk = max
{
0, wkij − c
S
i − c
H
j
}
be the total gain generated when the ith software seller, the
jth hardware seller and the kth buyer make a transaction. The above market is completely
determined by giving the sets of buyers and owners (or sellers) and the set of parameters
aijk.
In this paper we study a particular case of the above market obtained when all software
goods and hardware goods are respectively homogeneous, i.e. the valuation of each buyer
does not depend on which sellers she buys the two goods from. Therefore we can denote
wkij = w
k, and thus the profit generated by the ith software seller, the jth hardware seller and
the kth buyer is aijk = max
{
0, wk − cSi − c
H
j
}
. This latter type of markets generalizes the
bilateral Bo¨hm-Bawerk horse markets (Bo¨hm-Bawerk, 1923) to a multilateral situation, and
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hence will be called multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk markets.
We analyze multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk markets within the framework of multi-sided as-
signment games, which are introduced by Quint (1991) as the generalization of two-sided
assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), and they have been studied also in Lucas
(1995), Stuart (1997), Sherstyuk (1998, 1999), Braˆnzei et al. (2007) and Tejada and Rafels
(2010). The two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market has also been reinterpreted as an auction game
in Schotter (1974) and Muto (1983). A game-theoretical study of the two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
market can be found in Shapley and Shubik (1972), Moulin (1995), Osborne (2004) and Nun˜ez
and Rafels (2005).
The main objective of this paper is to study the set of extreme core allocations of multi-
sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games. To do so, to each m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment
game we associate a nonnegative convex game of m players, which are fictitious agents that
correspond to the m sectors of the market, and hence will be called the sectors game. We
prove that the core and the set of extreme core allocations of this latter game are strongly
related with those of the former. As a consequence, we show that all extreme core allocations
of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game are marginal worth vectors, generalizing a
property that holds for all two-sided assignment games (Hamers et al., 2002). We also give
attainable bounds for the number of extreme core allocations of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game and we study when the core of these games is stable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation
and we describe the multi-sided assignment model. In Section 3 we introduce the class of
multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk problems and we present the results of the paper.
2 Preliminaries and notation
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is the finite set of players and v(S) ∈ R for
any coalition S ⊆ N , being v(∅) = 0. The core of a game is the set of allocations that
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cannot be improved upon by any coalition on its own. Formally, given (N, v), the core is
the set C(v) := {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N}, where as usual
x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi and x(∅) = 0. A game is balanced if the core is nonempty. A subgame of
(N, v) is any game (N ′, v′) where ∅  N ′ ⊆ N and v′ is the restriction of v to subsets of N ′.
A game is totally balanced if the core of any subgame is nonempty.
Given a finite set N , an ordering θ of N is a bijection from N to {1, ..., |N |}, where |N |
denotes the cardinality of N . Let Θ(N) be the set of all orderings of N . Given (N, v),
the marginal worth vector mθ(v) ∈ Rn associated with θ is defined (see Shapley, 1972) by
mθi = v({j ∈ N : θ(j) ≤ θ(i)}) − v({j ∈ N : θ(j) < θ(i)}), for all i ∈ N . A game (N, v) is
convex if for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i} we have v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≤ v(T∪{i})−v(T ).
It is well-known (Shapley, 1972, and Ichiishi, 1981) that a game is convex if and only if its
core coincides with the convex hull of all marginal worth vectors.
Given a cooperative game (N, v), a vector x ∈ Rn is efficient if
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N). The set
of imputations is the set of individually rational efficient vectors, i.e. I(v) = {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥
v({i}),
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N)}. An imputation x dominates another imputation y via coalition
S ⊆ N if x(S) ≤ v(S) and xi > yi for all i ∈ S. Then, a binary relation is defined on the set
of imputations: given x, y ∈ I(v), we say x dominates y if it does so via some coalition. With
this definition, the core C(v), whenever it is nonempty, is proved to coincide with the set of
undominated imputations. This means that all allocations outside the core are dominated,
although not necessarily dominated by a core allocation.
A subset V of imputations is a stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) if it
is internally stable (for all x, y ∈ I(v), x does not dominate y) and externally stable (for
all y ∈ I(v)\V , there exists x ∈ V such that x dominates y). Since the core is the set of
undominated imputations, all the stable sets of a given game (N, v) contain its core. And
when the core is a stable set, then it is the unique stable set.
An m-sided assignment problem (m-SAP) denoted by (N1, ..., Nm;A), is given by m ≥
2 different nonempty finite sets (or sectors) of agents N1, ..., Nm and a nonnegative m-
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dimensional matrix A = (aE)E∈
∏m
k=1
Nk
. With some abuse of notation, let Nk = {1, 2, ..., nk}
for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. We shall refer to the ith agent of type k as i ∈ Nk. We name any
m-tuple of agents E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k an essential coalition. Each entry aE ≥ 0 represents the
profit associated to the essential coalition E. As an abuse of notation, we also use E to denote
the set of agents that form the essential coalition. An m-SAP is square if n1 = .... = nm.
A matching among N1, ..., Nm is a set of essential coalitions µ = {Er}tr=1 where t =
min1≤k≤m |N
k| and any agent belongs at most to one of the essential coalitions E1, ..., Et.
We denote by M(N1, ..., Nm) the set of all matchings among N1, ..., Nm. An agent i ∈ Nk,
for some k = 1, ...,m, is unmatched under µ if it does not belong to any of its essential
coalitions. A matching is optimal if it maximizes
∑
E∈µ aE in M(N
1, ..., Nm). We denote by
M∗A(N
1, ..., Nm) the set of all optimal matchings of (N1, ..., Nm;A).
For each multi-sided assignment problem (N1, ..., Nm;A), the associated multi-sided as-
signment game (m-SAG) is the cooperative game (N,ωA) with set of players N = ∪
m
k=1N
k
composed of all agents of all types and characteristic function
(1) ωA(S) = max
µ∈M(N1∩S,...,Nm∩S)
{∑
E∈µ aE
}
, for any S ⊆ N ,
where the summation over the empty set is zero.
Given (N,ωA), its core, C(ωA), coincides with the set of nonnegative vectors x = (x11, ..., x1n1 ;
...;xm1, ..., xmnm), where xki stands for the payoff to agent i ∈ N
k, that satisfy aE −∑m
k=1 xkik ≤ 0 for any E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k, where the inequality must be tight if
E belongs to some optimal matching, and xki = 0 if agent i ∈ N
k is unmatched under some
optimal matching. The two latter conditions guarantee the efficiency of the core allocations.
In the case of only two sectors, i.e. m = 2, the above setting reduces to the classic
Shapley-Shubik assignment market (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). It is well-known that two-
sided assignment games are totally balanced. However, for more than two sides the core of
a m-SAG may be empty -see Kaneko and Wooders (1982) in a more general framework or
Quint (1991)- and also balanced m-SAGs might not be totally balanced (Quint, 1991).
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3 The Bo¨hm-Bawerk model
The three-sided markets described in the Introduction can be easily generalized to include
arbitrary m-sided markets with m− 1 different types of homogeneous goods. When m = 2
the setting reduces to the classical bilateral Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment market, a celebrated
model that has received wide attention in the literature (see Introduction). Observe that each
buyer or seller in these markets is characterized by a single arbitrary nonnegative valuation,
and the set of all these valuations are the basic data of the market. As in the case of Shapley
and Shubik bilateral market, no restrictions are placed on communication, on transfers of
money, or on transfers of goods.
The basic problem is to decide how the profitability of the market that comes from the
differences in subjective valuations is going to be shared among sellers and buyers. In this
market, a profit can only be reached through trades among agents in the market, i.e. assigning
buyers to sellers and forming matchings. Hence, the situation fits into the framework of multi-
sided assignment games. Thus, to analyze the problem we define a multi-sided assignment
game based on the set of valuations of buyers and sellers and we study its core. In the
particular case of two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games, it is well-known that the core
is a segment, whose extremes are the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal allocations. In
this paper we generalize these results.
Let us introduce a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market (or problem) with an arbitrary
number of sectors.
Definition 1 An m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market (or problem) is a pair (c;w) where c =
(c1, ..., cm−1) ∈ R
N1 × ... × RNm−1 are the sellers’ valuations and w = (w1, ..., wnm) ∈ R
Nm
are the buyers’ valuations.
From now on, in order to simplify the analysis of the model we will assume that valuations
of the sellers of each sector are arranged in a nondecreasing way and valuations of the buyers
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are arranged in a nonincreasing way, i.e.
(2) ck1 ≤ ... ≤ cknk , for all k = 1, ...,m − 1 and w1 ≥ ... ≥ wnm .
Given an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk problem (c;w), we denote by A(c;w) the m-dimensional
matrix defined by
(3) aE = max
{
0, wim −
m−1∑
k=1
c
kik
}
, for all E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk.
Notice that, by (2), for all E,E′ ∈
∏m
k=1N
k,
(4) E ≤ E′ =⇒ aE ≥ aE′ .
When no confusion may arise, we will write simply A instead of A(c;w). Example 1
below is based on an example from both the paper of Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Bo¨hm-
Bawerk’s (1923) book, modified in such a way that each seller has been unsymmetrically
split up into two different sellers. That is, eight individuals each have one software good
for sale and eight other individuals each have one hardware good for sale. Also ten other
individuals each wish to buy exactly one software good and one hardware good. Although
all software goods are alike and all hardware goods are alike, traders (either buyer or sellers)
have different subjective valuations. This numerically specific market will be used through
the paper and it will translate into a 26-person cooperative game (instead of an 18-person
game in the case of Shapley and Shubik). We use S1, ..., S8, H1, ...,H8 and B1, ..., B10 to
denote respectively the software sellers, the hardware sellers and the buyers.
Example 1 A three-sided market with the following agents’ valuations:
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Software sellers Hardware sellers Buyers
S1 values her good at $5 H1 values her good at $5 B1 values a pair at $30
S2 values her good at $5 H2 values her good at $6 B2 values a pair at $28
S3 values her good at $7 H3 values her good at $8 B3 values a pair at $26
S4 values her good at $8 H4 values her good at $9 B4 values a pair at $24
S5 values her good at $11 H5 values her good at $9 B5 values a pair at $22
S6 values her good at $12.7 H6 values her good at $10.3 B6 values a pair at $21
S7 values her good at $13 H7 values her good at $12 B7 values a pair at $20
S8 values her good at $13 H8 values her good at $13 B8 values a pair at $18
B9 values a pair at $17
B10 values a pair at $15
Given (c;w) an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market, (N,ωA(c;w)) is the associated multi-sided
assignment game -see (1)-, which we will call a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game,
where N is composed of all sellers and buyers and ωA(c;w) is defined by (1) and (3).
For all i ∈ N, we introduce the notation Ei := (i, ..., i) ∈ Rm. By (2), the diagonal
matching {Ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is an optimal matching (in general it is not the unique opti-
mal matching), where n := min1≤k≤m nk. In this paper we study the core C(ωA(c;w)) of
(N,ωA(c;w)), which coincides with the following set:
(5)

x ∈ RN
1
+ × ...× R
Nm
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x(Ei) = aEi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
x(E) ≥ aE for all E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k and
xki = 0 for all i ∈ N
k, k ∈M and i > n.

,
which is a polyhedral in RN
1
+ × ...×R
Nm
+ and hence it has a finite number of extreme points
1.
From Quint (1991), we know that (N,ωA(c;w)) is a totally balanced game, which implies that
C(ωA(c;w)) is always nonempty.
As seen in the Introduction and using (3), only when aE > 0 there exist prices that
1x ∈ C(ωA) is an extreme point of C(ωA) if x =
1
2
x′ + 1
2
x′′ where x′, x′′ ∈ C(ωA) implies x = x
′ = x′′.
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support a trade between the agents that form the essential coalition E and imply a Pareto
improvement with respect to the non-trade situation. A matching among N1, ..., Nm assigns
agents to agents and form essential coalitions and singletons, and hence can be interpreted
as a collection of trades. We define r as the highest number of Pareto-improving trades that
can take place simultaneously:
(6) r = max
1≤i≤n
{i : aEi > 0} ,
with the convention that r = 0 if all entries of A(c;w) are zero. We say that i ∈ Nk, for
some k = 1, ..,m, is active if 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Otherwise we say that i ∈ Nk is inactive.
We also introduce a vector tc;w ∈ R
N1 × ...×RN
m
which includes the nonnegative differ-
ences in valuations of either sellers or buyers with respect to the corresponding rth seller of
the same sector or rth buyer, respectively. As we show in Theorem 1, allocations of C(ωA(c;w))
can be decomposed into two terms, one variable term and one constant term given precisely
by t. The translation vector tc;w = (t11, ..., t1n1 ; ...; tm1, ..., tmnm) ∈ R
N1× ...×RN
m
is defined
by
tki = max{0, ckr − cki} for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ nk,
tmi = max{0, wi − wr} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ nm.(7)
In Example 1, we have r = 5 (it is marked in bold in Example 1) and
tc;w = (6, 6, 4, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0; 4, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 8, 6, 4, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
In the following, to any multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game we associate another
game defined on the set of sectors M = {1, ...,m}. Below we discuss why we call these
fictitious players as sectors. To define this new game we only take into account both the rth
and the r + 1th agents (if exist) from each sector of the original multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game. Notice that a natural way to identify coalitions of the set of sectors M
with essential coalitions of the set of agents N arises: for any S ⊆M we define the notation
ES := r1S + (r + 1)1M\S ∈ R
m, where, for each T ⊆ M , 1T ∈ R
m is the vector such that
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1T (k) = 1 if k ∈ T and 1T (k) = 0 if k /∈ T . The case in which there is no r + 1
th agent for
some of the sectors in M\S must be treated separately, because in this case ES ∈ Rm can
still be defined but it is not an essential coalition of N , i.e. ES /∈
∏m
k=1N
k.
Definition 2 Given an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)), the associated
sectors game (M,vM
c;w) is the cooperative game with set of players M = {1, ...,m} composed
of all sectors and characteristic function defined, for each S ⊆M , by
vM
c;w(S) =

aES if E
S ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
0 if ES /∈
∏m
k=1N
k
if r > 0 and vM
c;w(S) = 0 if r = 0.
If vM
c;w(S) > 0 then necessarily E
S ∈
∏m
k=1N
k. By (6), if r > 0 we always have vM
c;w(M) =
aEM > 0 and v
M
c;w(∅) = 0. When no confusion may arise we will write simply v
M instead of
vM
c;w.
In Theorem 1 below we show that the core and the extreme core allocations of the sectors
game (M,vM
c;w) are strongly related to the core and the extreme core allocations respectively
of the multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)). Specifically, we prove that
for each allocation x ∈ C(vM
c;w), there is a unique core allocation x ∈ C(ωA(c;w)) such that
the variable part of the payoffs to agents of the kth sector at x coincides with the payoff to
sector k ∈M at x, and vice versa, hence giving sense to call these fictitious players as sectors.
Since payoffs in both games belong to different spaces ( RM versus RN
1
× ...×RN
m
), we need
to define a function to map payoffs in the sectors game to payoffs in the multi-sided Bo¨hm-
Bawerk game. Given an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)), we introduce
the replica operator Rc;w defined by
(8)
Rc;w : R
M −→ RN
1
× ... × RN
m
(x1, ..., xm) −→ (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
x1, ..., x1,
n1−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0; ... ;
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
xm, ..., xm,
nm−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0)
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Notice that Rc;w is an injective linear function. In the case of Example 1,
Rc;w(x1, x2, x3) =
(x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, 0, 0, 0;x2, x2, x2, x2, x2, 0, 0, 0;x3, x3, x3, x3, x3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Before proving the next theorem we introduce further some notation. Given t ∈ Rl and
B ⊂ Rl, let t + B := {x ∈ Rl : x = t + x′ and x′ ∈ B} denote the translated set B by the
vector t.
Theorem 1 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be anm-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game and let (M,v
M
A(c;w))
be the associated sectors game. Then,
1. C(ωA(c;w)) = tc;w + Rc;w(C
(
vM
c;w
)
).
2. Ext
{
C(ωA(c;w))
}
= tc;w + Rc;w(Ext
{
C
(
vM
c;w
)
)
}
).
Proof. We assume r > 0 to avoid (N,ωA) and (M,v
M ) being the null game, where both
statements can be easily verified. We start proving Part 1.
First we show that C(ωA) ⊆ tc;w + Rc;w(C
(
vM
)
). Let i ∈ Nk for some k ∈ M . We
introduce the notation Ei,k := i1{k} + r1M\{k} and E
i,k
:= r1{k} + i1M\{k}. If i ≤ r then
Ei,k and EM belong to an optimal matching, since
(9) aEi,k + aEi,k = aEM + aEi ,
where EM = Er = r1M and E
i = i1M . Next, we consider any x ∈ C(ωA). By core
conditions, x(Ei,k) = aEi,k > 0 and x(E
M ) = aEM > 0, where the positivity holds by (4)
and (6). Applying (3) and Definition 2, if we subtract these two latter expressions we obtain,
given i ∈ Nk such that i ≤ r,
xki − xkr = ckr − cki if 1 ≤ k < m and
xki − xkr = wi − wr if k = m.(10)
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If i > r there are two possibilities. Either i ∈ Nk is not assigned under diagonal matching or
it is assigned, which by core conditions implies x(Ei) = 0. In both cases, given i ∈ Nk such
that i > r, we obtain
(11) xki = 0, for all k ∈M.
Observe that (10) and (11), together with (7), imply that, given k ∈M and i ∈ Nk, then
xki + tki = xki + cki − ckr = xkr if i ≤ r and xki + tki = 0 if i > r. Let x = (x1, ..., xm) :=
(x1r, ..., xmr) ∈ R
m. By (8), x = tc;w + Rc;w(x). It remains to show that x ∈ C
(
vM
)
. On
the one hand, x(M) = x(EM ) = aEM = v
M (M) since EM belongs to an optimal matching.
Thus, x is an efficient allocation. On the other hand, let S ⊆ M be an arbitrary coalition
of sectors. If vM (S) = 0, we trivially have x(S) ≥ 0 = vM (S). Hence, assume vM (S) > 0.
In this case, x(S) = x(ES) ≥ aES = v
M
c;w(S) where the first equality holds by (11) and the
inequality holds since x belongs to C(ωA(c;w)). In conclusion, x ∈ tc;w + Rc;w(C
(
vM
c;w
)
).
Second we show that C(ωA) ⊇ tc;w + Rc;w(C
(
vM
)
). Consider x ∈ C
(
vM
)
and let x =
tc;w+Rc;w(x) ∈ R
N1×...×RN
m
, which by construction has nonnegative components. We start
proving that x is an efficient vector. We apply (7) and (8). On the one hand, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
we have x(Ei) =
∑m−1
k=1 (xk + (ckr − cki)) + (xm + (wi − wr)) = x(M) + aEi − aEM = aEi ,
where the last equality holds since x ∈ C
(
vM
)
. On the other hand, for all r + 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where n = mink∈M nk, we have
∑m
k=1 xki = 0 = ai...i. Lastly, if i ∈ N
k for some k ∈ M is
unassigned under the diagonal matching, then i > r and we have xki = 0.
It remains to check that, at x, no essential coalition can improve on their own. Let E =
(i1, ..., im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k be an arbitrary essential coalition and let SE := {k ∈M : 1 ≤ ik ≤ r}.
We distinguish two cases.
• Case 1: m ∈ SE.
If aE = 0, we trivially have x(E) ≥ 0 = aE. Hence, we assume aE > 0. Let E
′ :=
13
∑
k∈SE
ik1{k} + (r + 1)1M\SE . Then, by construction of x,
x(E) = xm + (wim − wr) +
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(xk + (ckr − ckik))
= x(SE) +
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik) + (wim − wr)
≥ vM (SE) +
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik) + (wim − wr)
= wr −
∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr −
∑
k/∈SE
ck(r+1) +
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik) + (wim − wr)
= wim −
∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckik −
∑
k/∈SE
ck(r+1) = aE′ ≥ aE,
where the first inequality holds since x ∈ C
(
vM
)
, the last inequality holds by (4) and
the last two equalities are obtained applying (3).
• Case 2: m /∈ S.
The proof is similar to that of the above case and it is left to to the reader.
Finally we prove Part 2. Since a translation does not change the extreme points of a
polytope, by Part 1 it is enough to prove that x ∈ Ext
{
C
(
vM
)}
if and only if Rc;w(x) ∈
Ext
{
Rc;w(C
(
vM
)
)
}
. This equivalence comes from observing that Rc;w(x) =
1
2Rc;w(x
′) +
1
2Rc;w(x
′′) if and only if x = 12x
′ + 12x
′′, since Rc;w is an injective linear function.
The above result shows that each core allocation x of a Bo¨hm-Bawerk multi-sided as-
signment game (N,ωA(c;w)), which is given by (5), can be decomposed into two terms: one
constant term given by tc;w which is different for any agent, and one common term (for all
agents of the same sector) given by the unique allocation x ∈ C(vM
c;w) associated to x.
Next we turn into the study of the sectors game and exploit its features to prove further
results of the original multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game. We start with the sectors
game associated to Example 1, which is shown below.
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vM ({1}) = a566 = 0 v
M ({1, 2}) = a556 = 1
vM ({2}) = a656 = 0 v
M ({1, 3}) = a565 = 0.7 v
M ({1, 2, 3}) = a555 = 2
vM ({3}) = a665 = 0 v
M ({2, 3}) = a655 = 0.3
The core of the above game is depicted in Figure 1.
.
..
..
.
(0, 0, 2)
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1)
(1.7, 0, 0.3)
(0, 1.3, 0.7)
(2, 0, 0)
(1.7, 0.3, 0) (0.7, 1.3, 0)
(0, 2, 0)
Figure 1: The core of the sectors game associated to a three-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment
game
The following proposition proves that the sectors game associated to a multi-sided Bo¨hm-
Bawerk assignment game has a special structure, it is a convex game.
Proposition 1 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game. Then, the
associated sectors game (M,vM
c;w) is convex.
Proof. First of all, observe that, by definition of the sectors game and (4), vM is monotone,
i.e. vM (S) ≤ vM (T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆ M . Next, let k ∈ M and S ⊆ T ⊆ M\{k}. We want to
show that
(12) vM (S ∪ {k}) − vM (S) ≤ vM (T ∪ {k}) − vM (T ).
We distinguish some cases.
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• Case 1: vM (S) > 0.
By monotonicity of vM , we have vM (S∪{k}), vM (T ∪{k}), vM (T ) > 0. Since vM (S) >
0, there exists the r + 1th agent (either seller or buyer) of the kth sector. Applying the
definition of the sectors game, the two terms of (12) are equal to wr − wr+1 if k = m
or ck(r+1) − ckr if 1 ≤ k < m. Thus (12) holds.
• Case 2: vM (S) = 0 and vM (S ∪ {k}) > 0.
By monotonicity of vM , we have vM (T ∪ {k}) > 0. Since vM (S ∪ {k}) > 0, there exists
the r+1th agent (either seller or buyer) for each of the sectors inM\ (S ∪ {k}). Suppose
k = m (the other cases are analogous and they are left to the reader). On the one hand,
if vM (T ) > 0 then (12) reduces to wr −
∑
l∈S clr −
∑
l∈M\S∪{k} cl(r+1) ≤ wr − wr+1,
which is equivalent to vM (S) = 0. On the other hand, if vM (T ) = 0 then (12) trivially
holds by monotonicity of vM .
• Case 3: vM (S) = vM (S ∪ {k}) = 0.
In this case (12) trivially holds by monotonicity of vM .
As a consequence of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 we provide a method to find all the
extreme core allocations of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game (see Corollary 1).
In words, for each extreme point of the core of an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game
there is a permutation of the set of sectors such that when we replicate and translate the
marginal worth vector associated to this latter permutation we obtain the former vector, and
vice versa.
Corollary 1 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be anm-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game and let (M,v
M
c;w)
be the associated sectors game. Then,
Ext
{
C(ωA(c;w))
}
=
{
tc;w + Rc;w
(
mθ(v
M
c;w)
)}
θ∈Θ(M)
.
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To illustrate the above result we study the extreme core allocations of the three-sided
Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game that corresponds to Table 1. The set Ext(C(ωA(c;w))) is
obtained from the six possible marginal worth vectors of (M,vM
c;w):
θ mθ(vM
c;w) tc;w +Rc;w
(
mθ(v
M
c;w)
)
(1,2,3) (0,1,1) (6,6,4,3,0,0,0,0;5,4,2,1,1,0,0,0;9,7,5,3,1,0,0,0,0,0)
(1,3,2) (0,1.3,0.7) (6,6,4,3,0,0,0,0;5.3,4.3,2.3,1.3,1.3,0,0,0;8.7,6.7,4.7,2.7,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(2,1,3) (1,0,1) (7,7,5,4,1,0,0,0;4,3,1,0,0,0,0,0;9,7,5,3,1,0,0,0,0,0)
(2,3,1) (1.7,0,0.3) (7.7,7.7,5.7,4.7,1.7,0,0;4,3,1,0,0,0,0,0;8.3,6.3,4.3,2.3,0.3,0,0,0,0,0)
(3,1,2) (0.7,1.3,0) (6.7,6.7,4.7,3.7,0.7,0,0;5.3,4.3,2.3,1.3,1.3,0,0,0;8,6,4,2,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(3,2,1) (1.7,0.3,0) (7.7,7.7,5.7,4.7,1.7,0,0;4.3,3.3,1.3,0.3,0.3,0,0,0;8,6,4,2,0,0,0,0,0,0)
Also as a consequence of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, the attainable lower and upper
bounds for the core payoffs of any active agent i ∈ Nk, k ∈M are respectively tki+ v
M ({k})
and tki + v
M (M)− vM (M\{k}). Moreover, for any ordering θ ∈ Θ(M) of the set of sectors,
the corresponding extreme core allocation tc;w+Rc;w
(
mθ(v
M
c;w)
)
of them-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)) can be interpreted as follows: agents of the first sector in θ
receive their best payoff, agents of the second sector in θ receive their best possible payoff
provided that agents of the first sector receive their best payoff, and so on and so forth,
hence generalizing the interpretation of the only two extreme core allocations in the case of
two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games as the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal.
Corollary 1 implies that the core of an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk game has at most m!
extreme core allocations. The next result shows that this bound is only attainable for multi-
sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games with at most three sectors, i.e. m ≤ 3, (see for instance
Figure 1).
Proposition 2 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game. Then,
• 1 ≤
∣∣Ext{C(ωA(c;w))}∣∣ ≤ m(m−1m/2) if m is even,
• 1 ≤
∣∣Ext{C(ωA(c;w))}∣∣ ≤ m( m−1(m−1)/2) if m is odd,
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and the bounds are attainable.
Proof. The lower bound is attained, for instance, when (N,ωA(c;w)) is the null game. By
Corollary 1, to calculate which is the number of extreme points of the core of (N,ωA(c;w)) it
suffices to count how many different marginal worth vectors of the associated sectors game
(M,vM ) there are. Let θ ∈ Θ(M) be an arbitrary ordering of the set of sectors. Given
k ∈ M , let Pθ,k := {l ∈M : θ(l) < θ(k)} be the set of predecessors of k w.r.t. θ, and
Fθ,k := {l ∈M : θ(l) < θ(k)} be the set of followers of k w.r.t. θ.
Since (M,vM ) is monotone, we can define t∗θ as the lowest integer t ∈ {1, ...,m} such
that vM ({k : θ(k) ≤ t}) > 0. Then, let k∗θ = θ
−1(t∗θ) be the agent that appears in the k
∗
θ-th
position in the ordering θ. Applying (3) and Definition 2, it can be checked that any marginal
worth vector of (M,vM ) has the following description
(13)
mθk(v
M ) =

0 if 0 ≤ θ(k) < t∗θ
aE
if θ(k) = t∗θ,
where E = r1Pθ,k∗
θ
+ r1{k∗
θ
} + (r + 1)1Fθ,k∗
θ
ck(r+1) − ckr if t
∗
θ < θ(k) ≤ m and k 6= m
wr −wr+1 if t∗θ < θ(k) ≤ m and k = m
Moreover, (13) reveals that, given θ, if we permute either the set of the predecessors or the
set of followers of k∗θ = θ
−1(t∗θ), the marginal worth vector (given by (13)) remains invariant.
That is, mθ(vM ) = mθ
′
(vM ) if Pθ,k∗
θ
= Pθ′,k∗
θ′
and Fθ,k∗
θ
= Fθ′,k∗
θ′
. For each order θ there
are (t∗θ − 1)! (m− t
∗
θ)! different orderings that are obtained permuting either the set of the
predecessors or the set of followers of k∗θ and thus give rise to the same marginal worth vector.
Observe that the more equidistant t∗θ is with respect to 1 andm, the smaller (t
∗
θ − 1)! (m− t
∗
θ)!
is. Thus, it is not difficult to check that
(14) min
t∗
θ
∈{1,...,m}
(t∗θ − 1)! (m− t
∗
θ)! =

(m/2)! (m/2− 1)! if m is even
((m− 1) /2)! ((m− 1) /2)! if m is odd
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When, for all θ ∈ Θ(M), t∗θ is the minimum value given by (14), we obtain the following
upper bounds for the number of extreme points of C(ωA):
• |Ext {C(ωA)}| ≤
m!
(m/2)!(m/2−1)! = m
(
m−1
m/2
)
if m is even,
• |Ext {C(ωA)}| ≤
m!
((m−1)/2)!((m−1)/2)! = m
(
m−1
(m−1)/2
)
if m is odd.
To prove that these bounds are attainable we consider some specific m-sided Bo¨hm-
Bawerk market with two agents (either sellers or buyers) for each sector. We need to distin-
guish two cases.
• Case 1: m is even.
Let us introduce the m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market (c;w) where c = (c1, ..., cm−1) ∈
R2(m−1) is given by ck = (1−ε, 2) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m−1, and w = (3m/2−1+ε, 3m/2−2),
for some small enough ε > 0. By the symmetry of the problem, it is easy to check that
(15) vM (S) =

0 if |S| < m/2
εm/2 if |S| = m/2
|S| (1 + ǫ)−m/2 if |S| > m/2
If ε > 0 satisfies ε(m/2 − 1) < 1 then 0 < εm/2 < 1 + ε. If we plug (15) into (13)
we realize that all marginal worth vectors mθ(vM ) have the same structure: they pay
0 to the first m/2 − 1 sectors in θ, εm/2 to the m/2th sector in θ and 1 + ε to the
last m/2 − 1 sectors in θ. Hence, to construct one marginal worth vector we proceed
as follows: we pick one sector k ∈ M and plug it into the ’central’ position m/2 + 1.
Then, among the remaining m − 1 sectors we pick m/2 to be the predecessors of k.
All marginal worth vectors that are constructed like this are different. Furthermore,
there are exactly m
(m−1
m/2
)
such vectors. Therefore the upper bound for the number of
extreme points is attainable.
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• Case 2: m is odd.
It is analogous to the above case by taking the m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market (c;w)
where c = (c1, ..., cm−1) ∈ R
2(m−1) is given by ck = (1− ε, 2) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, and
w = (3 (m− 1) /2, 3 (m− 1) /2 − 1 − ε), for some small enough ε > 0, and hence it is
left to the reader.
Observe that Proposition 2 tells that, as it is already known, a two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game (m = 2) has at most 2 extreme core allocations. Notice also that, for
instance, the maximum number of extreme core allocations is respectively 6, 12, 30, 60 for
m = 3, 4, 5, 6 respectively. We want to stress that the number of extreme core allocations
of an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game does not depend on the number of buyers or
sellers of each sector but only on the number m of sectors.
Hamers et al. (2002) prove that classical bilateral assignment games satisfy the CoMa-
property, i.e. any extreme core allocation is a marginal worth vector. We next show that this
property also holds for multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk games.
Theorem 2 Multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property.
Proof. We prove that for each extreme core allocation x of (N,ωA(c;w)) there is an ordering
θN ∈ Θ(N) of the set of agents N (composed of all buyers and sellers) such that x is the
marginal worth vector associated to θN . By Corollary 1, we know that every extreme core
allocation of (N,ωA(c;w)) is the translation and replica of one marginal worth vector of the
sectors game (M,vM
c;w). Taking advantage of the above facts, the proof of the theorem consists
on associating to each ordering of sectors θM ∈ Θ(M) an ordering of agents θN ∈ Θ(N) such
that mθ
N
(ωA) = tc;w + Rc;w(m
θM (vM )).
Without loss of generality let θM = (1, 2, ...,m) be the natural ordering of the set of
sectors. Then, let θN ∈ Θ(N) be any ordering of the set of agents (defined from θM )
constructed as follows: all inactive agents appear (arbitrarily ordered) before all active agents,
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i.e. θN (i′) < θN (i′′) for all i′ ∈ {i ∈ Nk : k ∈ M, i > r} and i′′ ∈ {i ∈ Nk : k ∈ M, i ≤ r},
and all active agents are ordered as follows,
(r ∈ N1, ..., r ∈ Nm, r − 1 ∈ N1, ..., r − 1 ∈ Nm, ... ... , 1 ∈ N1, ..., 1 ∈ Nm).
Notice that we are implicitly using the natural ordering θM in the restriction of θN to the
set of active agents since, for any index i ∈ {1, ..., r}, agents i ∈ N1, ..., i ∈ Nm are ordered
following the ordering of sectors θM = (1, 2, ...,m).
For notational convenience, we use mθ
N
ki (ωA) to denote the payoff to agent i ∈ N
k, k ∈M ,
according to the marginal worth vector mθ
N
(ωA). By (2) and (6), we have ωA(S) = 0 for all
S ⊆ N composed only of inactive agents. Hence, for all i ∈ Nk and k ∈ M such that i > r,
we have mθ
N
ki = 0, which coincides with the payoff to agent i ∈ N
k in the translation and
replica of mθ
M
k (v
M ).
Next assume that i ∈ Nk and k ∈M such that i ≤ r. By the definition of the characteristic
function ωA in the case of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game, ωA(S) is obtained as
follows. The buyer in S with higher valuation (if exists) and the sellers of each sector in S with
lower valuations (if exist) are arranged in an essential coalition E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k. If aE = 0 or E
cannot be formed we stop. If not, we keep repeating the above procedure with the remaining
agents, until either the new essential coalition has zero worth or no essential coalition can be
formed. Lastly ωA(S) is obtained adding up all the worths associated to essential coalitions
constructed. In other words, to obtain ωA(S) we partition S into ’ranking-ordered’ coalitions
and add up their corresponding worths.
In the case in which S = PθN ,i∪{i}, where PθN ,i denotes the set of predecessors of i ∈ N
k
w.r.t. θN , it is easy to check that the essential coalitions constructed by the above procedure
are (if exist)
Êi := (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
i, ..., i,
m−k︷ ︸︸ ︷
i+ 1, ...i + 1), ..., Êr := (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
r, ..., r,
m−k︷ ︸︸ ︷
r + 1, ...r + 1).
Similarly, in the case in which S = PθN ,i, the essential coalitions constructed by the above
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procedure are (if exist)
E˜i := (
k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
i, ..., i,
m−k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
i+ 1, ...i + 1), ..., E˜r := (
k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
r, ..., r,
m−k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
r + 1, ...r + 1) .
Therefore, by (2) and (6),
mθ
N
ki (ωA) = ωA(PθN ,i∈Nk ∪ {i})− ωA(PθN ,i∈Nk)
=
(
r−1∑
l=i
aÊl + v
M ({1, ..., k − 1, k})
)
−
(
r−1∑
l=i
aE˜l + v
M ({1, ..., k − 1})
)
=

ckr − cki + v
M ({1, ..., k − 1, k}) − vM ({1, ..., k − 1}), if k < m
wi − wr + v
M ({1, ..., k − 1, k}) − vM ({1, ..., k − 1}), if k = m

= tki +m
θM
k (v
M ),
where the third equality holds applying (3) to all entries of the matrix A in the sum, which by
(6) are strictly positive, and the last equality is obtained applying (7) and (8). Observe that
in the case where either Êr /∈
∏m
k=1N
k or E˜r /∈
∏m
k=1N
k we have vM ({1, ..., k − 1, k}) = 0
and vM ({1, ..., k − 1}) = 0, respectively.
In conclusion, mθ
N
(ωA(c;w)) =
−→
t c;w + Rc;w(m
θM (vM
c;w)) and hence (N,ωA(c;w)) satisfies
the CoMa-property.
In the final part of this paper we investigate when the core of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game is a stable set in the sense of von Neumann-Morgestern. Given a multi-sided
Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game, we say that agent i ∈ Nk, k ∈M is a null player if aE = 0
for all E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k such that i ∈ E. An special subclass of multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment games is the class of multi-sided assignment games with a constant matrix, i.e.
with all entries equal, which are called multi-sided glove markets (or T-markets, Braˆnzei et
al., 2007). A multi-sided glove market is therefore obtained when all buyers’ valuations are
the same and, for each other sector, all sellers’ valuations coincide.
Our next result identifies necessary and sufficient conditions which guarantee that the
core of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game is stable, and it generalizes the result
known for the two-sided case. Nevertheless, the proof presented here is not parallel to that
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of the two-sided case since, unlike for this latter case, in the general case there is not known
yet a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of an arbitrary multi-sided assignment
game to be stable (see Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001).
Proposition 3 Given an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)) without null
players, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) C(ωA(c;w)) is a stable set.
(b) (N,ωA(c;w)) is an square m-sided glove market.
Proof. Since there are no null players, we necessarily have r > 0. First we prove that (a)
implies (b). Consider the allocation
(16) y = (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
aE1, ..., aEr ,
n1−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ...0;
n2︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0; ...;
nm︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0) ∈ RN
1
× ...× ∈ RN
m
.
Suppose that y /∈ C(ωA). Since C(ωA) is stable, there must be x ∈ C(ωA) such that
x dominates y via coalition T ⊆ M and ωA(T ) > 0. Let E = (i1, ..., im) ⊆ T be some
essential coalition such that aE > 0. Then, x1i1 > y1i1 = aEi1 = x(E
i1) ≥ x1i1 ,where the
strict inequality holds by the domination conditions, the first equality holds by (16), the
second equality and the last inequality hold by (5). Hence, we have a contradiction and thus
y ∈ C(ωA). Analogously,
(17) z = (
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0;
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
aE1, ..., aEr ,
n2−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ...0; ; ...;
nm︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..., 0) ∈ C(ωA).
Next we prove that (N,ωA) is square. Suppose not, i.e. there is at least one inactive agent.
We can assume without loss of generality that r + 1 ∈ N1 exists. Let E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
{r + 1} × N2 × ... × Nm be any essential coalition containing agent r + 1 ∈ N1. Then,
y(E) = y1i1 = aEi1 = 0 ≥ aE ≥ 0, where the first two equalities hold by (16), the third
equality holds by (6) and the first inequality holds since y ∈ C(ωA). Therefore, aE = 0 for
all E ∈ {r+ 1} ×N2 × ...×Nm such that r+ 1 ∈ E, which contradicts (N,ωA) has not null
players.
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Lastly, we prove that A is a constant matrix. By (4) we have
(18) aE1 ≥ aE ≥ aEr for all E ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk = {1, ..., r}m.
Moreover, aE1 = y(E
′) = aE′ = z(E
′) = aEr , where E
′ = (1, r, ..., r), the first equality holds
by (16), the second and third equalities hold since y, z ∈ C(ωA) and, by (9), E
′ belongs to
some optimal matching, and the last equality holds by (17). Therefore, (18) reduces to a
chain of equalities and thus (N,ωA(c;w)) is an square m-sided glove market.
Second, we prove that (b) implies (a). Let (N,ωA) be an square multi-sided glove market
and let y ∈ I(ωA)\C(ωA). By (5), there must be an essential coalition E = (i1, ..., im) ∈∏m
k=1N
k such that y(E) < C. Consider the vector x ∈ RM defined by xk := ykik + δ/m, for
all k ∈ M , where δ := C − x(E) > 0. It is straightforward to check that x ∈ C(vM ), since
vM (M) = C and vM (S) = 0 for all S  M . Then, x = tc;w + Rc;w(x) ∈ R
N1 × ... × RN
m
belongs to C(ωA). Furthermore, we have ykik < xkik for all k ∈M . Then x dominates y via
E and C(ωA) is a stable set.
In the general case in which there might be null players, a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk
assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)) has an stable core if and only if the square r×
m︷︸︸︷... ×r submatrix
given by the active agents of each sector -where r is defined in (6)- is constant and the
remaining entries are null.
We conclude with two final remarks. On the one hand, one may be tempted to think that
the cooperative analysis of a multi-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk market made throughout this paper
can be simplified to the analysis of a (classical) two-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game, by
clustering the (m−1)-tuples of sellers (one of each sector) into single sellers. However, merging
sellers presents two main drawbacks. First, there is not a unique way to merge sellers. In fact,
if active sellers are merged with inactive sellers, the profitability of the market, i.e. the value
of the grand coalition in the corresponding cooperative game, may decrease. Second, even
if active sellers are merged with active sellers and inactive sellers are merged with inactive
sellers, the merging of the extreme points (or other solution concepts, e.g. the nucleolus) of
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an m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game may not coincide respectively with the extreme
points (or the nucleolus) of the merging of the m-sided Bo¨hm-Bawerk assignment game.
On the other hand, most markets are interesting precisely when the worths of coalitions
are not additively separable in individual agents’ contributions. In fact, this is the case in
our problem because of three potentially non-trivial aspects: (1) valuations are arbitrarily
nonnegative, (2) worths of essential coalitions are truncated at zero making this case distinct
from the purely additive case and (3) the number of firms and buyers may be arbitrarily
different.
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